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Diffusion and Focus in International Law Scholarship
Diane P. Wood*
of the ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw is a welcome event,
AlIthoughfactthemayadvent
,that
not be obvious to all followers of international legal scholarship.
After all, there are well more than seventy international law journals already being
produced in the United States alone.' A complete list would be hard to compile, and
in the end would still be uninformative, because of the simple fact that many
international articles regularly appear in general law reviews. Moreover there are many
distinguished journals published outside this country.2 Even if parochialism can be
forgiven in some areas (though it is hard to say which ones), surely it has no place in a
field devoted to reaching across national boundaries. The new Chicago Journal must
therefore find its place not only among its U.S. counterparts, but in the broader crowd
ofjournals devoted to international matters.
Even in making this point, however, the biggest problem for international legal
scholarship should be apparent. Which "international" things should the Journal be
addressing: classic public international law? Classic comparative law? The law of
international organizations? The law of regional groups such as the European Union
or the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference? Domestic laws addressed to international
issues? National laws regulating international transactions? Beyond those questions of
subject matter are questions of audience. At one extreme, the study of international
law is a highly philosophic inquiry that delves into topics such as the meaning of
sovereignty and the meaning of law itself. At the other extreme, international law may
conjure up the problems of the American lawyer trying to practice in Tokyo, Beijing,
or Paris, or the complexities of setting up a joint venture that will be entitled to
operate in Brazil. The audience interested in reading about the latter set of issues may
not have much overlap with the audience fascinated by the former.
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Senior Lecturer in Law, The
University of Chicago Law School.
1. See <http://www.law.umich.edu/pubs/ournals/mjil/links.htm> (visited Mar 4, 2000). This is the
number listed on the web site of the Michigan Journal of International Law, which has links to the
other journals. And that list is not a complete one, as is evident by the fact that it does not include
journals such as the ABA's InternationalLawyer, the University of Iowa's Journalof TransnationalLaw
& Contemporary Problems, the American Journal of Comparative Law, the Asian Law Journal, and the
Journalof InternationalTaxation.
2. The list is almost endless. For some of the more well-known journals, see, for example, the Swiss
Review of International Law, the Britisb Yearbook of InternationalLaw; Acadimie de Droit International,
The Hague, Recueil des Cours;Journalof World Trade, and European Competition Law Review. There are
a great many yearbooks of international law published in different countries, including
(alphabetically) the African, the Canadian, the Chinese, the German, the Hague, the Palestine, the
Polish, and the South African yearbooks, to name a few. And this ist excludes the many
publications in languages other than English.
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ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

Naturally enough, international legal scholarship has reflected the diffuse nature
of the subject matter it nominally addresses. Recently the American Journal of
International Law published papers from a symposium on Method in International
Law, which explored such approaches as positivism, policy-oriented jurisprudence,
international relations theory, feminism, and economics. 3 The Yale Journal of
International Law offered an article by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachman on
Economic Analysis of InternationalLaw,4 and another recent issue of the American Journal
of International Law had as its lead article, The Contemporary Law of Superior
Responsibility, by Ilias Bantekas, which examined the painfully topical issue of the
degree to which high-ranking military officers have a "command responsibility"
pursuant to which they are liable for their subordinates' crimes.' These are all
important contributions to an understanding of the international legal order. Indeed,
the recent attention to methodology may throw light on the vexing question of
whether there even is something that can be called an international legal order as
opposed to a political or social order. Skeptics (particularly those from the legal realist
tradition who see law in terms of raw power) have questioned the aptness of the term
"law" for the set of principles that govern relations among nations. This criticism may
have been well-founded, or understandable, in the past. Nevertheless, the more
rigorous methodologies now being brought to bear on international law show great
promise of beginning to reveal what deserves to be called "law" in the international
realm and at the same time of helping to develop the law further.
Legal scholarship in general reflects much the same variety of perspective and
audience, of course: it runs the gamut from the most abstract and theoretical
examination of the nature of law to the how-to-do-it articles and surveys that are
useful to the practicing lawyer in need of continuing legal education. But the fact that
international law has not even proven itself as "law" creates an important difference
between scholarship directed to issues of domestic law, whether it is the law of civil
procedure, or antitrust, or constitutional law, or the criminal justice system, and
international legal scholarship. This is because international law in its purest sense
does not enjoy the support, forceful or otherwise, of any single organized regime.
Instead, as J. L. Brierly put it in his classic treatment of the subject, "The Law of
Nations, or International Law, may be defined as the body of rules and principles of
action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another."'
Contrast that to the ordinary definition of law that appears in Black's Law Dictionary:
"... Law, in its generic sense, is a body of rules of action or conduct prescribed by
controlling authority, and having binding legal force.... That which must be obeyed

3. Steven R Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds, Symposium on Method in InternationalLaw, 93 Am J

Intl L 291 (1999).
4. 24 YaleJ Intl L 1(1999).
5. 93 AmJ Intl L 573 (1999).
6. J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the InternationalLaw of Peace 1 (Waldock 6th ed
1963).
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and followed by citizens subject to sanctions or legal consequences is a law.' Note the
importance of force standing behind legal norms in this definition. Although, happily,
this is rarely necessary in societies that live under the rule of law, twentieth-century
Americans know that it happens from time to time: recall the use of the National
Guard to enforce school desegregation orders, the use of the power of a court to throw
someone in jail for contempt to force compliance with orders, or, at a more ordinary
level, the ability of the local sheriff to seize property to compel compliance with a
money judgment.
It is hard to find a real equivalent at the international level. The idea of war as the
compliance-forcing mechanism is profoundly unattractive to a world that lives under
the United Nations Charter, and in particular Chapter VII of the Charter, which
entrusts the Security Council with the responsibility of deciding where and how force
should be used to maintain or restore international peace. Worse than that, in the
eyes of some, is the fact that the sources of international law are notoriously squishy.
Public international lawyers point to Article 38 of the Statute of the International

Court ofJustice ("ICJ") for the definitive list of these sources, which reads:
1. The [International] Court [ofJustice], whose function is to decide in accordance
with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59 [which provides that a decision of the
Court has no binding force except between the parties and for the particular
case], judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.9
Yet, particularly given the very narrow scope of the ICJ's jurisdiction, it is
difficult to see how these sources can add up to a body of international law that finds
international acceptance. National courts may express their opinions about
international questions; foreign ministries may write diplomatic notes; national
legislatures may enact laws that purport to reflect international principles. But there is
no final arbiter over the content of the law in the vast majority of cases, nor is there
any way to ensure that anyone follows it.
The biggest problem with the picture that emerges for international law is that it
is one that should not-indeed, cannot--continue. No one needs to be told that the
world has shrunk, that human rights violations in one part of the world are not only
morally reprehensible but also have practical repercussions elsewhere, that
environmental problems demand international solutions, that weapons of mass
destruction know no boundaries, and that the world has become a single economic
7. Black's Law Dictionary884 (West 6th ed 1990).
8. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat 1031.
9. Statute of the International Court ofJustice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat 1055.
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unit. The question instead is how to bring our laws and legal institutions into line
with this reality. Here, in the middle ground between the philosophy and cookbooks
that have largely characterized international legal scholarship, the need for creative
thinking and innovative scholarship is pressing. This is the gap that the Chicago
Journal and its counterparts should strive to fill, because international law is
important, necessary, and it makes a difference.
In the United States, the Supreme Court announced long ago in The Pacquete
Habana that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts ofjustice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions
of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."10 Years later, in
Banco Nacionalde Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Court, while holding on the one hand that the
act of state doctrine is not part of international law, concluded on the other hand that
"legal problems affecting international relations" were to be determined according to
federal law." Treaties, of course, are specifically mentioned in the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, Article VI, clause 2, but the Sabbatino decision indicates that
customary international law, as part of federal common law, is also supreme. And yet,
no one has ever found that customary international law can override an express statute
in the same way that a later treaty supersedes inconsistent earlier domestic laws. This
leaves international law in a rather unsatisfactory position in U.S. courts: there, but
not there, perhaps at most supporting a canon of statutory construction that requires
courts to interpret statutes so as not to conflict with international law if this is fairly
possible."
If anything, these general principles overstate the status that international law
has enjoyed in U.S. courts in recent years. The Supreme Court has had before it a
significant number of cases in which not only international law, but an international
vision, should have been woven into the fabric of the decision, but it was not. A few
examples will suffice to illustrate this point.
Breard v. Greene 4 presented the question whether the petitioner, Angel Francisco
Breard (a citizen of Paraguay) could pursue a claim for habeas corpus relief in U.S.
courts. In that case, petitioner wanted to argue that his conviction for murder and
capital sentence should be overturned because the State of Virginia violated the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations at the time of his arrest when it failed to
175 US 677,700 (1900).
376 US 398,425-27 (1964).
12. For the rule regarding treaties, see Restatement of the Law (Third): The Foreign Relations Law of
the United States § 115(2) (1986). See also Comment (d) to that section, which expresses the
opinion that "a later principle of customary law would supersede an earlier one [perhaps meaning an
earlier law, but unclear]." The Comment goes on to admit that there have been no judicial decisions
to this effect, and it concedes that it has not been authoritatively determined whether a later
principle of customary international law could supersede an earlier treaty or statute.
13. For expressions of the canon of construction, see, for example, Murray v Schooner CharningBetsy, 6
US (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). Consider Restatement of the Law (Third): The Foreign Relations
Law of the United States at § 114 (1986).
14. 523 US 371 (1998).
10.

11.
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inform him that he had the right to contact the Paraguayan Consulate. 5 In a separate
proceeding, the Republic of Paraguay brought suit in federal court for declaratory and
injunctive relief finding a violation of the Vienna Convention. Finally, on April 8,
1998, the Republic of Paraguay instituted a proceeding against the United States
before the International Court ofJustice, alleging that the United States had violated
the Vienna Convention. The ICJ responded with lightening speed, issuing an order
requesting that the United States take all measures to ensure that Breard was not
executed pending a final decision in the case. In a decision handed down April 14,
1998, which began by noting that Breard was scheduled to be executed at 9:00 p.m.
that very night, the Supreme Court found that the federal courts had no jurisdiction
over Breard's petition because he had procedurally defaulted his complaint about the
Vienna Convention years earlier. It rejected Paraguay's claims on Eleventh
Amendment grounds and on the theory that Paraguay was not a "person" within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Of greatest interest for present purposes is the way the Court handled the
international dimensions of this case. It first cited only U.S. cases for the proposition
that "in international law" it is well established that the procedural rules of the forum
state govern interpretation of a treaty. Without looking either to the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which represents an international consensus on
the methodologies to be used in treaty interpretation, or at the jurisprudence of a
single other country, the Court also offered the opinion that the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations also embodied this principle, in Article 36(2). Last, again with
very little analysis, it concluded that the subsequently enacted Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act overrode Breard's alleged right under the Vienna
Convention to a hearing on his claims. 6 The latter discussion contains not a word
about reconciling international law with domestic legislation if at all possible. The
Court was not even willing to issue a stay to protect the status quo while the ICJ
proceedings moved forward. All this bespeaks a rather low status for the international
principles that were at stake.
Although a look at the briefs that were filed in Breard's case suggests that the
problem was not the lawyers' failure to call to the Court's attention the relevant
sources of international law, not everyone is as well represented as Breard was in the
final days and moments of his life. Not many American lawyers are adept in using the
sources of international law, and even fewer have experience searching the laws of
other countries to see how they may have interpreted treaties and international
agreements to which the United States is a signatory. And yet, even the Supreme
Court of the United States has recognized on occasion that if the question at hand is
the meaning of an agreement, it can be very useful to see how others subject to the
same agreement have interpreted it. It did so in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd v Tsui Yuan

15.

Id.

16. See id at 375-77.
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Tseng, a case in which the Court confronted a question under the Warsaw
Convention.'8 Specifically, it had to decide whether, when the Warsaw Convention
itself did not permit a recovery in damages for an incident, an injured party could
nonetheless bring a suit for damages under another source of law (there, the tort law
of New York). The Court found that the answer was no, and that the Warsaw
Convention blocked remedies that went beyond those authorized within the
Convention. In so holding, however, it took into account a decision of the British
House of Lords that had confronted more or less the same question, and it also
referred to decisions from other signatory states."
It seems, however, that the Tseng decision may be the exception rather than the
rule. The decisions of other jurisdictions are discussed in United States v AlvarezMacbain, ° but almost exclusively in the dissenting opinion. Alvarez-Macbain was a case
in which the question was whether a criminal defendant before a U.S. court who had
been abducted from his homeland (Mexico) by agents of the U.S. government could
assert a defense to the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. The majority thought that the
case could be resolved by asking whether the extradition treaty between the two
countries forbade kidnapping; the dissenters recognized that no extradition treaty
would so provide, because jurisdictional principles derived from international law
make it clear that no country may exercise its police powers outside its territorial
boundaries without the permission of the other. The same disregard for international
practice appears in Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc,2" where the Court upheld the
U.S. Coast Guard practice of intercepting vessels on the high seas (that is, beyond any
arguable limit of U.S. territorial jurisdiction) that were allegedly illegally transporting
passengers from Haiti to the United States. By cutting the ships off on the high seas,
the Coast Guard could return the people to Haiti without determining whether they
qualified as refugees under § 243(h)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and
Article 33 of the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
For anyone who thinks that international law really is part of the law of the
United States, or even that it ought to be, these decisions do not represent a desirable
state of affairs. It would be unfair in the extreme to place all the blame at the feet of
international legal scholarship, but perhaps some belongs there, and some belongs in
the way international law has been taught during the twentieth-century in American
law schools. But somehow, the message has not been getting through to the bench and
bar that, in the words of the Supreme Court in Bremen v Zapata Off-Sbore Co,2 "[we
cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters
525 US 155 (1999).
iS. The fill
name of the convention is the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air, Oct 12, 1929, 49 Stat 3000, TS No 876 (1934), which can be
found in the note following 49 USC § 40105.
19. 525 US at 175-76 & n 16.)
2o. 504 US 655 (1992).
17.

21.
22.

509 US 155 (1993).
407 US 1 (1972).
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exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts."23 True
enough, and the same can be said of issues touching on international human rights, on
the resolution of issues concerning legislative and enforcement jurisdiction, on the
development of a shared understanding of international agreements to which the
United States is party, and a host of similar questions.
Law and lawyers tend to be conservative, in the old sense of the term: change
usually comes slowly, in an evolutionary fashion; predictability comes from a refusal to
jettison too much of the old too quickly. But it is imperative that we move beyond the
parochial approach to international legal matters that characterized much of the
twentieth-century. The challenge for legal scholarship in this area is to find a way to
bring international law into the mainstream. Step one will be simply to educate
students, lawyers, and judges about the subject matter. Step two will be to broaden
the perspectives used in that educational process so that the views of people outside
the United States are part of the conversation. Even something as well-known and
well-respected as the ALI's Restatement of the Law (Third): The Foreign Relations
Law of the United States relies to an astonishing degree on U.S. sources and
materials. This choice, in the ALI's defense, was surely dictated in part by the fact that
the Restatement was designed to present foreign relations law from the U.S. point of
view, not from a universal point of view. Yet, one of the leading international law
casebooks used in U.S. law schools does much the same thing.24
The second task will be complicated somewhat by language barriers, given the
fact that a distressing number of Americans do not have the ability to work
comfortably in one or more languages other than English. Nevertheless, English
speakers are fortunate (especially as the Internet expands exponentially), because
English has become the second language of choice in virtually the entire non-Englishspeaking world. The excuses for lack of familiarity with scholarship from other
traditions have thus already become weak, and they will fall even flatter over time.
And of course, a scholarly journal such as the new Chicago Journal should take every
opportunity to take advantage of the language skills of its authors to help expose its
readers to the views of others on the important questions of international law.
Finally, it may be possible to develop a more satisfactory notion of what
international law is. Plainly it is no longer limited to Brierly}s idea of the law of
nations. Too many obligations now run between nation-states and individuals for that
to be true. Individuals and companies are also more or less third-party beneficiaries of
treaties governing international trade, the environment, the law of the sea, and world
health. The newer methodologies noted earlier have begun to look beyond the
traditional divisions among public international law, comparative law, and private law,
to a broader vision of the international legal order. This too will help bring
international law into active play within our legal culture. The challenge for
international legal scholarship is not a modest one: shape theories that will work for
23.

Id at 9.

24.

See Barry C. Carter and Philip R Trimble, InternationalLaw (Aspen 3d ed 1999).
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the coming century, not two centuries ago; find a way to make them matter to
ordinary lawyers and courts in cases where they should be considered; and above all,
abandon parochialism in method, in thought, and in outcome. Even in the midst of so
many fellow publications, this mission should keep the Chicago Journal of International
Law busy for many years to come.

